Penetration Testing &
Red Team Operations
The person behind the cases.
Known offenses.
Eight open cases. Everything listed has been run, on client work or in my own lab. Click a case to open its file.
- BloodHound triage beyond shortest-path: derivative local admin chains and edges the default queries miss
- Targeted Kerberoasting: SPN hunting, then offline cracking tuned to the password policy
- AS-REP Roasting: preauth-disabled accounts, cracked offline
- RBCU abuse: read access to one object is often enough to take it over
- DCSync or forgery: picking the quieter path based on the noise the client will tolerate
- Token impersonation: the last hop to domain admin
beacon> logonpasswords
- IDOR by object ID pattern: sequential IDs, UUID leaks in responses, role flips
- Business logic races: coupon stacking, redemption races, step skipping
- Auth architecture flaws: JWT confusion, session fixation, OAuth misflows
- Blind SQLi: time-based and out-of-band channels where errors are suppressed
- Chain building: low findings combined into full account takeover
- Retest discipline: every fix is verified before a finding is closed
- APK decompilation: exported components, backup and debuggable flags
- Storage forensics: SharedPreferences tokens, unencrypted SQLite, logs
- Weak cryptography: hardcoded keys, static IVs, and ECB mode where it should never appear
- Deep link abuse: exported intents hijacked live on device
- Pinning bypass: traffic inspection when the app fights back
- External truth sweep: what answers on the wire vs what the asset list claims
- Foothold expansion: one credential to the whole flat network
- Manual service exploitation: scanner verdicts verified by hand
- Segmentation validation: proving the guest VLAN can reach tier-0
- Fileless pipeline: fetch, decode, RW to RX, execute, zero disk writes
- C2 discipline: register, poll, rekey every session
- Sandbox patience: randomized sleeps outlast detonation windows
- Isolated verdicts: Defender, Bitdefender and Sophos tested one change at a time
beacon> blockdlls start
Full methodology in build log 01, build log 02 and build log 04, PoC evidence included.
- PE anatomy: DOS header to section table, mapped by hand
- Base relocations: the delta applied to every absolute address
- IAT resolution: imports wired without the loader's help
- Alert intuition: why hollowing detections fire, from the inside
beacon> execute-assembly Seatbelt.exe -group=system
The whole ritual is written up in build log 03, PoC video included.
- Dual telemetry: Bitdefender GravityZone and Sophos MDR review
- Phishing forensics: header and attachment analysis with a clear verdict on every mail
- IR drills: host isolation under pressure
- Feedback loop: alert reading that sharpened the offense
- CVSS v3.1: scored against the client's environment, not defaults
- Executive summaries: written for the CTO, not the scanner
- Implementable fixes: remediation a developer can act on
- Verification retests: prove the patch, close the case
beacon> download Report.pdf
Experience.
The case files ran on real client networks. Click a role for the scope.
- Engagement ownership: I run each engagement end to end, from scoping with the client through exploitation, reporting, and the remediation retest.
- Coverage: web applications, Android apps (MASVS), internal and external networks, and Active Directory environments.
- Malware triage: reverse engineering samples that surface in client cases and feeding indicators back to the client's defenses.
- Reporting: CVSS v3.1 scoring, executive summaries, and a retest of every fix before the engagement closes.
- Web pentesting: tested applications in Burp Suite Pro against the OWASP Top 10, reporting IDOR, SQL injection, XSS, and broken access control.
- Endpoint telemetry: worked Bitdefender GravityZone and Sophos MDR queues during incident response drills and helped isolate compromised hosts.
- Phishing analysis: inspected headers and attachments to confirm spoofed senders and malicious payloads.
Build Logs
Long-form writeups of my own lab projects: what I built, what got caught, and what the defender sees on the other side.
How a small Rust loader sidestepped Windows Defender
A fileless loader caught on the first try, and the one word in the detection name that explained everything: behavior, not content.
I wrote a RAT in Rust to learn what EDRs actually catch
An enterprise EDR flagged exactly one behavior of my implant. Remove it, and the whole tool walked through clean.
Manual PE mapping: running an EXE like the Windows loader
Sections, relocations, imports, and the jump: the loader ritual performed by hand, plus my own reverse shell written from scratch in C.
I rebuilt the named-pipe injection technique to learn where EDRs actually draw the line
A console named-pipe injection loader in C and assembly, taken through Defender, Bitdefender and Sophos one variable at a time. The engines allow the data; they kill execution that leaves loaded modules.
Certifications
Red teaming, offensive security, and AppSec certifications from hands-on exams.
CRTO
Certified Red Team Operator
Zero-Point Security
open ↗
CRTP
Certified Red Team Professional
Altered Security
open ↗
CRTA
Certified Red Team Analyst
CyberWarFare Labs
open ↗
CEH
Certified Ethical Hacker v12
EC-Council
open ↗
CAP
Certified AppSec Practitioner
The SecOps Group
open ↗
CC
Certified in Cybersecurity
ISC2
THM
Top 2% Globally
TryHackMe
open ↗